We show that heterogeneous firms choose different locations in respond to market integration. Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of efficient firms in the larger country where they have access to a bigger pool of consumers. In contrast, high-cost firms seek protection against competition from efficient firms by locating in the smaller country. However, when the spatial separation of markets ceases to be a sufficient protection against foreign competition, high-cost firms choose to set up in the larger market. Hence, the relationship between economic integration and international productivity gap first increases and then decreases with market integration.
Introduction
Firms are heterogeneous in many respects and, therefore, choose different strategies. For instance, it is well documented that more productive firms export in several countries while less efficient firms focus on their local markets only.
1 As market integration gets deeper, this discrepancy in export strategies amplifies because lower trade costs intensify product market competition and trigger a selection effect of firms in each country (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) . However, firms' selection may also take place across space. Indeed, one expects more efficient firms to set up in larger markets where they can better exploit scale economies, whereas less efficient firms would relax competition by seeking protection in smaller markets. In other words, trade liberalization may not only select the best firms within countries, but it may also entice them to sort out across countries. And indeed, some recent empirical studies devoted to firm heterogeneity and location choice point to that direction. Using US concrete industry data, Syverson (2004) observes that inefficient firms barely survive in large competitive markets and tend to leave them. This result is confirmed by the emerging literature that follows Syverson (Asplund and Nocke, 2006; Del Gatto et al., 2008; Foster et al., 2008) .
The aim of this paper is to study the spatial selection of firms once it is recognized that heterogeneous firms typically choose different locations in respond to trade liberalization.
In other words, we focus on the specific location choices made by heterogeneous firms, the reason being that trade liberalization has a strong impact on the intensity of competition across spatially separated markets, hence on the ability of firms to operate in large or small, close or distant, markets. One of the main features of our approach is that it allows us to fully capture the fact that, everything else being equal, high-cost firms tend to move away from low-cost firms to soften competition. Our emphasis is thus on sorting across locations. In the trade literature with heterogeneous firms, the selection of firms takes 1 The empirical evidence is mounting (Bernard and Jensen, 1995 , 1999 , 2004 Tybout and Westbrook, 1995; Aw et al., 2000; Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard et al., 2003; Eaton et al., 2004) .
place through their entry and exit in the local markets but not through their relocation between markets. The focus is on firms' export strategy (local producer or exporter) and on the impact of trade liberalization on the average productivity of each trade partner.
In contrast, our model is more in line with economic geography, which highlights the impact of trade liberalization on firms' location choices and the emergence of endogeneous comparative advantage that determine the productivity of countries. By starting from a perspective different from that of Melitz (2003) , Helpman et al. (2004) and others, our paper sheds new light on the firm selection problem, while contributing to the economic geography literature.
In order to better account for the impact of competition on firms' mark-ups and profits,
we use the linear model of monopolistic competition (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004 ) and introduce cost heterogeneity across firms. Unlike the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, the linear model captures the pro-competitive effect generated by decreasing mark-ups in larger markets and allows us to account for the impact that price competition has on the way heterogeneous firms distribute themselves across space. Our setting also allows for a full analytical and simple description of the equilibrium firm distributions as well as a precise and detailed analysis of the impact of all structural parameters on firms' behavior. In particular, we show how location choices act as a selection device across heterogeneous firms by determining the number and types of firms in each country.
It is worth stressing that Duranton and Overman (2005) find that industries are highly heterogeneous in their location behavior: in some industries, larger plants tend to be clustered and smaller ones dispersed, whereas the opposite holds in other industries.
Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation to these observations by identifying the conditions under which the market outcome displays one pattern or the other.
The idea that heterogeneous firms are sorted across different markets goes back at least to Syverson (2004) and Nocke (2006) . By building an alternative framework that borrows from trade theory and economic geography, we are able to uncover several new results. First of all, we show that efficient and inefficient firms tend to move away from each other with a deeper economic integration. Specifically, decreasing trade costs lead to the gradual agglomeration of low-cost firms in the larger market because these firms are able to survive in a more competitive environment. In contrast, high-cost firms seek protection against competition from the low-cost firms by establishing themselves in the smaller country. For some domain of trade cost values, perfect selection arises with all low-cost firms being established in the large country and all high-cost firms in the smaller country. This two-way process of relocation sparks a productivity gap between countries, which is exacerbated when the asymmetry between countries gets bigger. This is not the end of the story, however. As the global economy gets more and more integrated, the selection effect is turned up-side down, the market access effect stressed by economic geography becoming the dominant force. More precisely, as the spatial separation of markets ceases to be a sufficient protection against competition from the low-cost firms, high-cost firms also choose to set up in the larger market where they have access to a bigger pool of consumers. Our setting thus leads to the following prediction: as market integration deepens, the productivity gap first widens and then shrinks. This result is to be contrasted with Baldwin and Okubo (2006) , who show that firms' response to decreasing trade costs is a one-way process in which only the low-cost firms established in the small country move to the large one: the high-cost firms are not sorted out because the DixitStiglitz model of monopolistic competition implies a fixed mark-up. Furthermore, firm heterogeneity may act as an agglomeration force or as a dispersion force. Specifically, when there are many efficient firms, increasing heterogeneity strengthens the agglomeration of firms in the larger market because this market becomes less competitive. On the other hand, when there are few efficient firms, increasing heterogeneity fosters dispersion, the reason being that these firms aim to relax competition within their own group. We also show that the home market effect always holds under firm heterogeneity; however, its magnitude varies in a non monotone way with the relative numbers of low-cost and high-cost firms. Last, spatial selection is such that markups and price dispersion are smaller in the large than in the small country, which agrees with the empirical evidence provided by Syverson (2007) .
As said above, our paper is related to Nocke (2006) who deals with the selection of heterogeneous entrepreneurs. Similarly to us, this author shows that the most capable entrepreneurs locate in the largest markets, while the least capable entrepreneurs set up in the smallest markets. This is because large markets help entrepreneurs to cover their entry costs. Nocke extends this result to deal with trade costs. When these costs become sufficiently low, all firms set up in the largest markets. Rather, in our setting, spatial selection arises because markets are spatially separated and firms incur trade costs. By investigating the properties of the market outcome, we are able to disentangle in a precise and intuitive way the various effects at work. For instance, as trade costs fall, we show that low-cost firms leave the smaller country before any high-cost firms also start to leave that country. We are also able to determine how the heterogeneity parameters interact to determine the market outcome and the distribution of firms. Last, perfect sorting always arises in Nocke, a result that does not reflect the above-mentioned variety of firms'
behavior. By contrast, our setting reveals how and when the relative numbers of firms' types affects the sorting of firms across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, we determines the equilibrium distribution of firms and study the impact of trade costs and firm heterogeneity on the market outcome. The last section summarizes our main results and discusses some extensions.
The model
Consider a world with two countries or regions (i = 1, 2), two production factors (capital and labor), and a global population having a unit mass. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and one unit of capital, both of which are supplied inelastically. Let country 1 host the larger population and let λ ∈ (1/2, 1) denote the share (and mass) of consumers in country 1, which implies that λ also measures that country's shares (and masses) of labor and capital. Consumers are immobile and can supply labor only in the country where they reside. In contrast, they are free to supply capital wherever they want. The spatial distribution of capital is endogenous and will be determined as an equilibrium outcome. To disentangle the various channels through which this happens, we will distinguish between a short-run equilibrium when firms are immobile, and a long-run equilibrium when they are mobile.
Preferences and demands
The economy involves a tradeable homogeneous good and a tradeable differentiated good, which is made available as a continuum of horizontally differentiated varieties indexed by v.
2 Preferences are the same across consumers and given by a quasi-linear utility function with a quadratic subutility. Consumers in country i solve the following problem:
where q i (v) and p i (v) are the consumption and the consumer price of variety v, Z i and p Z i are the consumption and the consumer price of the homogeneous good, and y i is the consumer income. The initial endowment Z 0 > 0 of the homogeneous good is sufficiently large for the consumption of this good to be strictly positive at the market outcome. This 2 One may be interested to isolate the effect of trade from the effect of firm heterogeneity on spatial sorting because not all firms export. In Okubo and al. (2008) , we show that the structure of spatial equilibria with non-tradeable goods is very similar to the one considered here for the sake of conciseness.
assumption is made to capture the idea that consumers like to consume the two goods.
As to the parameters, α > 0 expresses the intensity of preference for the differentiated product, γ > 0 measures the substitutability across varieties, whereas β > 0 expresses the intensity of the preference for variety.
The individual demand is
is the consumer price index in country i.
Technologies and trade costs
The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition by using one unit of labor. Our purpose being to investigate how firms' heterogeneity affects the spatial distribution of firms, we isolate this effect by working with a setting in which workers' wage is equalized between countries. This is guaranteed by assuming that the homogeneous good is costlessly traded.
3 Under this assumption, the price of the homogeneous good is equal across countries and is chosen as the numéraire (p
). This implies a workers' wage equal to 1 in both countries.
Each variety of the differentiated good is produced by a single firm under increasing returns and monopolistic competition. A firm needs one unit of capital (after normalization) and hires a quantity of labor proportional to its output. Though capital is homogeneous, firms are heterogeneous. Specifically, there are two types of firms described by the superscript θ: high-cost firms (θ = h) requires m > 0 units of labor to produce one unit of the differentiated good, while low-cost firms (θ = l) require a lower amount of labor units, which we may normalize to zero because demands are linear. If q denotes the volume of production, high-cost and low-cost firms incur the following costs:
In the short run, the international distribution of capital and the shares of low-cost and high-cost firms in each country are fixed. So, let 0 ≤ N ≤ 1 be the mass of capital invested in country 1, and let the mass of low-cost and high-cost firms in the economy be respectively denoted by µ and 1 − µ, where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, while the share of θ-firms in country 1 is denoted by 0 ≤ s θ ≤ 1. Hence, the mass of capital invested in country 1 is given by the mass of high-cost firms (s h (1 − µ)) plus the mass of low-cost firms (s ℓ µ) set up therein:
Observe that, in our setting, firm heterogeneity is captured through the two parameters m and µ. As will be seen, they may have different impacts on the international distribution of firms.
Finally, international shipments of any variety of the differentiated good incur a trade cost of t > 0 units of the numéraire per unit of variety shipped.
Prices and profits
Each firm is free to set a consumer price specific to the country in which it sells its variety.
Let us then denote by p θ ji (v) the consumer price of variety v set in country i by a θ-firm located in country j = 1, 2, and by q θ ji (v) the corresponding individual demand. More precisely, the individual demands in countries 1 and 2 for a variety produced in country 1 become:
where
is the consumer price index of the differentiated good in country 1. Mirror expressions hold for country 2. The demands (2) reveal a common feature of monopolistically competitive models: each firms treats parametrically the price index P i which represents an inverse measure of the intensity of competition in country i.
In the short-run equilibrium, consumers maximize utility, firms maximize profits, and product and factor markets clear. Since θ-firms located in country 1 are symmetric, they charge the same prices and earn the same profits π θ 1 defined as follows:
In the manufacturing sector, firms play a noncooperative game with a continuum of players. Each firm has, therefore, no impact on price indices and chooses its profit-maximizing prices taking price indices as given. When the product markets clear, equilibrium values of price indices are consistent with firms' pricing decisions. This yields the equilibrium prices in country 1 charged by the local and foreign firms are given by
where the equilibrium price index is Given (4), profits for each type of firm in country 1 may be rewritten as follows:
These two expressions show that, within the same country, profits of low-cost firms are always higher than those of high-cost firms: π ℓ i > π h i . In the foregoing, we have assumed that all firms export regardless of their distributions across countries and types. This requires that both the marginal cost m and trade cost t are sufficiently low. That is, a high-cost firm finds it profitable to export to the larger market when all the other firms are low-cost and located in country 1 (µ = 1, N = 1):
3 Spatial selection as an equilibrium outcome
In the long run, capital is mobile, meaning that firms may change location. Capital is assigned to firms according to some exogenous rule that determines the ownership structure of firms. For example, in the wake of Melitz (2003), we could assume that individuals first allocate randomly their capital to firms according to the c.d.f. (µ, 1 − µ), and then discover their firms' type. Alternately, capital could be traded on an integrated market as in the footloose capital model (Martin and Rogers, 1995) , while the productivity rent is accrued to heterogenous entrepreneurs whose consumption place is exogenously given (Okubo et al., 2008) . Once they know the type of their firms, individuals seek the location that allows them to earn the higher return. Because returns are equal to firms' profits, individuals choose to set up their firms in the more profitable country. The share of low-cost firms in country 1 is, therefore, given by
while the share of high-cost firms is
As a result, the long-run equilibrium depends on profit differentials for each type of firms and, hence, is determined by the locational decisions made by firm-owners. Observe that individuals' earnings vary with the country where they establish their firm. However, because individuals have quasi-linear preferences, their actual earnings do not affect their demand for the differentiated product. This implies that the selected capital assignment rule has no impact on the demands for this good. It affects only the demand for the homogeneous good.
Perfect or partial selection
We first determine the profit gap for high-and low-cost firms between countries 1 and 2.
For high-cost firms, we have:
Plugging the equilibrium prices (4) into this expression, we obtain
Likewise, for the low-cost firms, we get
Clearly, the first term of ∆π h is always strictly smaller than the first term of ∆π ℓ , whereas the second is the same and given by
Consequently, it must be that
This implies that an interior configuration, i.e. 0 < s h < 1 and 0 < s ℓ < 1, cannot be a long-run equilibrium. Stated differently, at least one type of firms must be agglomerated at the long-run equilibrium. So, we are left with five possible configurations: (i) coagglomeration of all types of firms in the larger market when 0 < ∆π h < ∆π ℓ and thus s * h = s * ℓ = 1; (ii) partial selection of high-cost firms in the larger market when ∆π h = 0 < ∆π ℓ , so that s * ℓ = 1 while s * h is an interior solution; (iii) perfect selection of low-cost and high-cost firms when ∆π h < 0 < ∆π ℓ , so that s * h = 0 and s * ℓ = 1; (iv) partial selection of low-cost firms in the smaller market when ∆π h < 0 = ∆π ℓ , which implies that s * h = 0 and s * ℓ is an interior solution; and finally (v) co-agglomeration in the smaller market when ∆π h < ∆π
By studying the behavior of functions ∆π h and ∆π ℓ with respect to s h and s ℓ in [0, 1], we can determine which configuration is a long-run equilibrium. Assume µ > 1/2 and set
where the dominators are positive and the last inequality holds because of the trade feasibility condition. When µ ≤ 1/2, we set ν ℓ = ν h = 0.
It is easy to see that the (unique) solutions to the equations ∆π h (s h , 1, λ) = 0 and ∆π ℓ (0, s ℓ , λ) = 0 are respectively given by
The following result is proved in Okubo et al. (2008) . Firms faces a proximity-competition trade-off in that they benefit from a better proximity to the larger market but face tougher competition in this market when more firms agglomerate there. Proposition 1, illustrated in Figure 1 , tells us how market size asymmetry affects the selection of low-cost and high-cost firms. Specifically, when the two countries have very different sizes, all firms co-agglomerate in the larger country because the proximity benefit outweighs the cost of competition (case (i)). Regardless of the value of trade costs, country 1 is so large that the access to its market is always the dominant force. For the same reason, co-agglomeration in the smaller country is never an equilibrium. As the difference in market size becomes smaller, some high-cost firms re-locate in the smaller country, which offers them better protection against the competition of low-cost firms (case (ii)). High-cost firms completely sort out when asymmetry in size declines further (case (iii)). The long-run equilibrium then involves perfect selection, with all high-cost firms being located in the smaller country and all low-cost firms in the large one. It is worth noting that, in all configurations but co-agglomeration in which the comparison is meaningless, markups and price dispersion in country 1 are smaller than in country 2 (P * 1 < P * 2 ). Last, as market size asymmetries (λ − 1/2) become sufficiently small, some low-cost firms find it profitable to set up in the smaller country in order to soften competition with the bulk of low-cost firms located in the larger country (case (iv)).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Clearly, for all the configurations described in Proposition 1 to be possible, µ must be larger than 1/2. When µ ≤ 1/2, the configurations (iii) and (iv) never arise because ν h and ν ℓ are equal to zero. In other words, the larger country always hosts all the low-cost firms as well as some high-cost ones. This is because the number of low-cost firms is sufficiently small to make the intensity of competition in the larger market weak enough for some high-cost firms to locate there. In contrast, when low-cost firms are many (µ > 1/2), these may want to get dispersed between the two countries in order to relax competition within their own group. In this case, more than half of the low-cost firms set up in the larger market (see (10)), while all the high-cost firms agglomerate in the smaller one in order to be located away from the larger number of low-cost firms.
For completeness, it remains to discuss the special case of two symmetric countries (λ = 1/2). It then follows from (6) and (7) that
Hence, since firms have exactly the same incentives to locate in any country, they do not sort out. Consequently, country-size asymmetry is necessary for spatial selection to arise.
Since the co-agglomeration of firms is never an equilibrium, profit differentials must be equal to zero in equilibrium (∆π h = ∆π ℓ = 0). By (8), this implies that any pair (s h , s ℓ ) such that µs ℓ + (1 − µ)s h = 1/2 and 0 ≤ s h , s ℓ ≤ 1 is an equilibrium. In other words, there exits a continuum of equilibria because there is no selection effect. However, there is still a composition effect within each country in that the two types of firms are substituted according to their relative numbers: a unit increase in the number of low-cost firms in country 1 implies a decrease equal to (1 − µ)/µ in the number of high-cost firms. We may select a unique equilibrium, given by the limit of the equilibria obtained in Proposition 1
In what follows, we assume throughout that λ > 1/2.
One of the main results known in economic geography is the home market effect (henceforth, HME), which states that the larger country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004) . This result has been derived in the case of homogeneous firms. It is therefore natural to ask the question: how is the HME affected when firms are heterogeneous? The HME holds if the larger country hosts a share of capital that exceeds its share in expenditure, i.e. N * > λ. It turns out to be more convenient to check whether N * − 1/2 is larger than λ − 1/2.
(i) In the co-agglomeration configuration, N * − 1/2 is equal to 1/2 while λ − 1/2 is slightly less than 1/2. (ii) In the configuration with partial selection of high-cost firms (s ℓ = 1 and s h = s h ), we have
Under the trade feasibility condition, it is readily verified that the term multiplying (2λ−1)
is always larger than 1/2. (iii) In the configuration with perfect selection (s ℓ = 1 and s h = 0), we have
Using the trade feasibility condition, this expression is larger than ν h , which itself exceeds λ − 1/2. (iv) Finally, in the configuration with partial selection of low-cost firms (s ℓ = s ℓ and s h = 0), we obtain
The term multiplying (2λ − 1) is exceeds the corresponding term in (11), so that it must also exceed 1/2. To sum up, in all equilibrium configurations, we have
Hence, we have:
Proposition 2 Under the trade feasibility condition, the home market effect holds regardless of the degree of firms' heterogeneity.
Therefore, In the homogeneous firm case, the intensity of the HME rises when trade costs decrease. Since the terms multiplying λ − 1/2 in configurations (ii) and (iv) include trade costs as well as firm heterogeneity parameters, we may expect a richer set of results.
To see what happens, the next two sections thoroughly discuss the impact of trade costs and firm heterogeneity on firms' locations.
Trade costs
We are now equipped to undertake the standard thought experiment of economic geography by determining the values of trade costs for which the above configurations are long-run equilibria. It is readily verified that a rise in trade cost from t = 0 (weakly) decreases the number of firms in the larger country. Indeed, all the thresholds (ν A , ν h , ν ℓ ) increase with t, whereas both s h and s ℓ decrease with t. Therefore, as t increases, the graph of s * h is shifted rightward (see Figure 1 for an illustration). This means that a rise in trade costs (weakly) decreases the number of high-cost firms in the larger country. As the same argument applies to the graph of s ℓ , a rise in trade costs also (weakly) decreases the number of low-cost firms in the larger country. The long-run equilibrium can then be characterized as a function of trade costs as it follows. Let us fix the country size asymmetry λ and let t A be the value of trade costs such that ν A is equal to λ − 1/2. When µ > 1/2, let t h and t ℓ be the values of trade costs such that ν h and ν ℓ are respectively equal to λ − 1/2. Because ν A < 1/2 under the trade feasibility condition, t A is always positive and smaller than t trade . Likewise, we have t A < t h < t ℓ < t trade . The above discussion can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under the trade feasibility condition, the equilibrium location of high-and low-cost firms is characterized by (i) co-agglomeration in the larger country if t ∈ (0, t A );
(ii) partial selection of high-cost firms in the larger country if µ > 1/2 and t ∈ [t A , t h ) or if µ ≤ 1/2 and t ∈ [t A , t trade ); (iii) perfect selection of high-and low-cost firms if µ > 1/2 and t ∈ [t h , t ℓ ); and (iv) partial selection of low-cost firms in the smaller country if µ > 1/2 and t ∈ [t ℓ , t trade ).
This proposition is illustrated in the left hand panel of Figure 2 . Decreasing trade costs affects the location and selection of firms as increasing market size asymmetries does. In particular, as market integration gets deeper, i.e. as trade costs fall from t trade , low-cost firms sort completely out of the smaller country before high-cost firms begin to sort out. In other words, lower trade costs first entice more low-cost firms to locate in the larger country and then, after all of them have relocated, it entices high-cost firms to move away from the smaller market. Consequently, the share of low-cost firms in the larger country always exceeds the share of high-cost firms, whereas the opposite holds in the smaller country.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Proposition 2 has another important implication about the relative competitiveness of different territories, namely the larger market is always more productive than the smaller market, which agrees with the empirical studies mentioned in the introduction. However, trade liberalization does not always exacerbate international disparities. Indeed, the relationship between trade liberalization and the international productivity gap is bell-shaped. This is illustrated in the right hand panel of Figure 2 where the productivity gap is measured as the difference between the averages of marginal costs in the small and large country (this difference is always positive). As trade costs fall from very high values to t ℓ , the productivity gap widens because low-cost firms relocate in the larger country. In contrast, the average productivity of each country does not change when trade costs vary within [t h , t ℓ ] because there is no relocation of firms. Finally, when trade costs fall further below t h , high-cost firms now move to the larger country, thus reducing the productivity of this country and, therefore, diminishing the productivity gap. Hence, in the presence of cost heterogeneity, the impact of trade costs on average productivity is not monotone.
We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
The large country is always more productive than the small one. However, as market integration gets deeper, the productivity gap between the large and small countries first increases and then decreases.
Observe, in passing, that Proposition 1 implies that a similar result holds for asymmetries in population sizes as measured by λ.
Firm heterogeneity
In this section, we turn to another important issue, i.e., the impact of firms' heterogeneity on their location choices. There are two ways to tackle this issue since there are two parameters that capture firms' heterogeneity, i.e. m and µ. We first consider the impact of an increase in the cost differential measured by the difference between high-cost and low-cost firms' marginal costs.
It is easy to see that s ℓ increase with m. In other words, when partial selection of lowcost firms in the smaller country prevails, increasing m leads more low-cost firms to set up in the larger country. Indeed, a larger cost differential makes it harder for the high-cost firms to export in the larger market, thus softening competition in that market. This in turn entices some low-cost firms to relocate there. In contrast, it is readily verified that s h decreases with m: when partial selection of high-cost firms in the larger country prevails, increasing m induces fewer high-cost firms to set up in the larger country. This is because competition in that country becomes harsher for these firms, thereby inducing them to seek protection against competition from the low-cost ones by establishing themselves in the smaller country. Thus, we have:
Proposition 5 Under partial selection, a larger cost differential leads more low-cost firms to locate in the large country or more high-cost firms to locate in the small country.
We now investigate the impact of rising the mass of low-cost firms in the global economy. First of all, note that µ has no impact on the location pattern in configuration (i), in which there is co-agglomeration of both types of firms in the larger country. In configuration (ii), which involves partial selection of the high-cost firms, the number of firms located in the larger country is equal to N * = µ + (1 − µ) s h so that, by (11), we get
Hence, as the number of low-cost firms in the global economy grows, the number of firms located in the larger country decreases. There are two effects at work. Whereas the mass µ of low-cost firms in country 1 rises at a unit rate, the mass (1 − µ) s h of high-cost firms in this country decreases at a higher rate:
This is because the higher mass of low-cost firms in country 1 intensifies competition in this market. Low-cost firms are, therefore, more effective in deterring high-cost firms to set up in the larger market. As µ increases, the selection effect becomes stronger and yields a higher concentration of high-cost firms in the smaller country.
In configuration (iii) involving perfect selection of low-cost and high-cost firms, the number of firms in country 1 is given by N * = µ, which increases with µ. Although less high-cost firms are now established in the smaller country, all these firms prefer to stay in this country because of the selection effect.
Last, in configuration (iv), which involves partial selection of low-cost firms, the number of firms located in the larger country is given by N * = µ s ℓ . Using (12), it can readily be verified that
which means that a growing number of low-cost firms in the global economy leads to a lower number of low-cost firms in the larger country. This means that the share of lowcost firms in the larger country ( s ℓ ) decreases faster than the mass of low-cost firms in the global economy (µ) increases. Indeed, the higher number of low-cost firms in the global economy strengthens competition in each market, thus inducing a larger share of these firms to locate in the less competitive market, i.e. country 2. First, it is worth comparing two economies when they involve low-cost or high-cost firms only. They do not display the same pattern of firms because N * (1) = s ℓ (1) > N * (0) = s h (0). In other words, there are more firms in the larger country when all firms are low-cost than when they are all high-cost. This is because the share of trade cost in marginal cost is larger for low-cost firms than for high-cost firms. As a result, the opportunity cost to relocate to the small country is larger for low-cost firms. Low-cost firms are therefore more reluctant to locate in the smaller country, meaning that more firms agglomerate in the larger country when the economy involves only low-cost firms. To put it in another way, once all firms are homogeneous, the HME is stronger when firms are low-cost rather than high-cost. Second, as also shown by Figure 3 , when µ ∈ (0, µ h ), firms are more dispersed in a heterogeneous environment than in a homogeneous environment with high-cost firms only (i.e. N * (µ) < N * (0)). Conversely, for µ ∈ (µ ℓ , 1), firms are less dispersed in a heterogeneous environment than in a homogeneous environment involving low-cost firms only (i.e. N * (µ) > N * (1)). Hence, heterogeneous environments can yield economic spaces that are either more or less agglomerated than their homogeneous counterparts. Stated differently, the HME varies in a non monotone way with the relative numbers of low-cost and high-cost firms.
Last, an economy with low-cost and high-cost firms can display a spatial pattern that is not the corresponding combination of the two homogeneous patterns. Among other things, this implies that there is a discrepancy between the impacts of "marginal" and "finite" changes in the number of low-cost firms on firms' agglomeration. Indeed, whereas a marginal rise in µ fosters dispersion in configurations (ii) and (iv), an finite increase shifting the economy from configuration (ii) to configuration (iv) leads to a different selection pattern that results in more agglomeration.
All of this leads to the following result (see Okubo et al., 2008 , for more details).
Proposition 6 The magnitude of the home market effect is a non monotone function of the number of low-cost firms: it first decreases, then increases, and last decreases again.
Furthermore, there exist thresholds (µ h , µ ℓ ), with 1/2 ≤ µ h ≤ µ ℓ ≤ 1, such that for µ ∈ (0, µ h ), the heterogenous economy results in more dispersion than the economy with only high-cost firms, and such that for µ ∈ (µ ℓ , 1), the heterogenous economy yields less dispersion than the economy with only low-cost firms.
Observe that a unilateral change in m or µ triggers a similar change in the global average marginal cost m(1 − µ). Consequently, the above comparative statics implies the variation of this cost, which affects indirectly the equilibrium outcome. It is, therefore, worth comparing the locus depicted in Figure 3 with the distribution of firms obtained when all firms have the same marginal cost equal to m(1 − µ). In this benchmark case, we know from Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) that the equilibrium distribution of firms is given by
which is a linear and upward sloping function of µ; it is represented in Figure 3 by the dashed line connecting points N * (0) and N * (1). This line intersects the equilibrium locus with heterogeneous firms at a single point µ. When the number of low-costs firms is not too high (µ < µ), there is more dispersion when firms become heterogeneous. To illustrate, assume that µ ≃ 0, which implies m(1 − µ) ≃ m. When a few firms become low-cost, the m(1 − µ)-firms have almost the same cost both in the homogenous and heterogenous worlds, whereas the low-cost firms get a significant cost advantage in the heterogenous world. As a result, the latter firms sort out in the larger country, which makes competition tougher therein and entices a more than proportionate number of m(1 − µ)-cost firms to seek protection in the smaller country. In contrast, when the number of low-cost firms is high (µ > µ), there is less dispersion when firms become heterogeneous. To illustrate, we now assume that µ ≃ 1 so that m(1 − µ) ≃ 0. When a few firms become high-cost, the m(1 − µ)-cost firms keep almost the same cost both in the homogenous and heterogenous worlds, whereas the high-cost firms face a strong cost disadvantage in the heterogenous world. Consequently, these firms seek protection in country 2, while the smaller number of low-cost firms makes the global economy less competitive. These two effects combine to make the low-cost firms less dispersed.
Concluding remarks
Our main results may be summarized as follows. (i) Spatial selection arises in that efficient firms tend to locate in large countries and inefficient firms in small countries.
This prediction can be confronted with data. When firms' total productivity is skewed to the left, large and efficient firms should be more or less dispersed, whereas small and inefficient firms would be clustered in the periphery. In contrast, when the bulk of firms is inefficient, both types of firms should be located in prosperous regions, whereas lagging regions would accommodate only inefficient firms. These findings may then be compared to those obtained by, say, Duranton and Overman (2005) .
(ii) Decreasing trade costs leads more efficient firms to locate in the larger market. (iii) The productivity gap is not a monotone function of the degree of integration. This could be tested using a methodology similar to that developed by Forslid et al. (2002) . (iv) The productivity difference between large and small economies also stems from the selection of heterogeneous firms between countries, regions and cities, not just from their selection within such territories. How to distinguish from the econometric viewpoint between the two types of selection is an important issue that cannot be addressed here. (v) The home markets always holds, but its magnitude is a non monotone function of the number of (in)efficient firms.
Admittedly, our framework suffers from several drawbacks. First, we have assumed that labor is homogeneous. Once we allow for different types of labor, it is well known that more efficient workers tend to locate in larger markets (Combes et al., 2008) , thus rendering these markets more attractive to the efficient firms. This in turn should make these ones even more efficient and workers better paid. Second, though fairly standard in the economics literature, the assumption of two types of firms is restrictive. It is well known that dealing with several types gives rise to technical difficulties that do not deeply affect the main results. Proposition 1 then suggests that the spatial selection of firms across markets obeys a cascade-like process based on their respective productivity.
In the limit case of a continuum of types, there is perfect sorting (Nocke, 2006) . Last, 
